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ECONOMIC MEASUREMENTS AND 

QUALITY OF LIFE IN MEXICO 

CONSTANTINE P. DANOPOULOS 

San Jose State University 
Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 2004, Vol. 32, No.2 (Winter): 193-206 
Using the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI), the article seeks to 
evaluate the quality of life in modern Mexico. The GPI employs the same 
indicators used to arrive at per capita GDP, but adds positive and negative 
monetary and non-monetary actors that affect people's lives. Monetary factors 
include income distribution, increased health care cost due to air and water 
pollution, and loss of wetlands. Non-monetary factors involve parenting, time 
spent in highways, loss of leisure time, the cost of volunteer work, and other 
social costs. Ifone takes these into account, the purchasing power and quality of 
life ofMexican citizens are considerably lower than the per capita GDP would 
indicate. 
Economically speaking, modem Mexico is a paradox. According to 
official statistical data, the country's 2002 per capita Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) was over $8800 dollars. Yet the same data shows that 40 percent of 
Mexicans live below the poverty line, which the World Bank sets at $2 per 
person per day. The country has a relatively strong industrial base and is the 
world's sixth largest oil producer. Mexico City and other major cities are lined 
with broad boulevards and sport modem high-rise building and other modem 
facilities. But Mexican citizens battle unbearable traffic jams, pervasive official 
corruption, and air, water and other forms of pollution. Health care is poor and 
lack of clean water, deforestation, and deteriorating agricultural land are a few 
of the many ills afflicting modem Mexico 
If statistical tables and economic indices are to be taken as the sole 
criteria, the Mexican economy has performed well. According to official 
government statistics, per capita GDP has increased from a mere $2085 in 1950 
to over $8800 in 2002. Yet this is not reflected in the daily lives of Mexican 
citizens. Oil revenues have enabled the government to seek the creation of a 
modem diversified industrial economy, but the country's auto industry is barely 
functioning and there are very few quality Mexican industrial products available 
in American and other world markets. Do statistics fail to tell the story? Is there 
a problem with economic indices? Why Mexico has been unable to match South 
Korea, Taiwan, Spain, and other success stories? And are there any remedies 
and solutions to Mexico's plight? 
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ON GDP, GPI, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
In order to be able to study economic activity and to help governments 
design, plan, and implement economic policy, economists sought to develop 
techniques and indices to measure and compare economic performance over 
time and across cultures. The last seven decades have seen a proliferation of 
such indices, aiming to track economic activity within individual countries and 
worldwide. National as well international organizations, such as the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) and the World Bank, collect, interpret, and 
disseminate volumes of economic data purporting to measure economic growth, 
levels of poverty, and a host of other indicators, including government spending 
on the environment, defense, and education and numerous other social 
programs. 
One of the most well known indices-and one that has gained 
considerable national and international currency in recent years-is the GDP. 
There are three equivalent approaches to calculating GDP: income, product, and 
expenditure. The first includes the income received by all producers, in the 
country; the second sums up the market value of goods and services; and the 
third is based on final spending on goods and services. The expenditure 
approach, which is the most widely used, sums up four types of expenditures: 
consumption, investment, government purchases, and net exports (Quick MBA 
Economics, 1999-2004). 
Distinct from GDP is the Gross National Product (GNP), which 
measures the output of a nation's factors of production, regardless of whether 
they are located within the country's borders or outside. In contrast, GDP is 
generally defined as the market value of the goods and services produced by a 
country. For example, GNP includes the output of nationals working in another 
country, but GDP does not. In other words, GDP includes production within 
national borders, regardless of whether the labor, assets, and property inputs are 
domestically or foreign owned. In comparison, GNP incorporates income earned 
by the factors of production (assets and labor) owned by a country's residents, 
but leaves out income generated within the country's borders by factors of 
production owned by nonresidents. More and more economists consider the 
GDP as a more accurate measurement of economic performance "because it 
provides the greatest and broadest sectoral detail of any other data" (Quick MBA 
Economics, 1999-2004). Finally, worth noting is the Purchasing Power Parity 
(PPP) concept which measures the purchasing power of a country's currency. 
That is, "the number of units of that currency required to purchase the same 
representative basket of goods and services (or a similar basket of goods and 
services) that a US dollar (the reference currency) would buy in the United 
States" (Human Development Report, 1998:220). 
Despite its widespread acceptability and use, GDP is not without its 
shortcomings. A group of economists have criticized it as a flawed and wanting 
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measurement of economic performance. Jason Venetoulis and Cliff Cobb are 
among GDP's severest critics. In their minds, accurate economic indicators must 
be "value free," and GDP is not. Using data from the San Francisco Bay Area 
(1950-2002), they observe that by concentrating exclusively on "monetary 
transactions as economic activity," the GDP disregards "social and 
environmental costs and contributions" and puts "zero value" on such important 
"things as the destruction of farmland and natural resources, longer-commute 
times, and the loss of free time." When one includes these factors in to the 
economic equation, "the result is a substantially different picture than that 
presented by the GDP." Venetoulis and Cobb conclude that the GDP is not a 
good "barometer" measuring a nation's "economic health and well-being, [or] a 
yardstick of economic progress" (Venetoulis and Cobb, 2004: 1-5). 
The two economists propose a different, more inclusive, more 
comprehensive, and less value-free measuring index of economic performance: 
the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI). It employs the same indicators that are 
used in the GDP, but adds positive and negative factors that affect people's 
lives. In excess of twenty indicators go into the equation, including income 
distribution, and the value of volunteer and housework. Three non-monetary 
types of benefits, left out in GDP calculations, are taken in to consideration by 
the GPI: the value of time spent on household work, parenting, and volunteer 
work; the value of services of consumer durables (such as refrigerators); and 
services ofhighways and streets (Venetoulis and Cobb, 2004:3). 
Besides inserting these three clusters, Venetoulis and Cobb subtract 
three new categories of expenses that impinge on people's quality of life. The 
first of the three are called "defensive expenditures," which they define "as 
money spent to maintain the household's level of comfort, security, or 
satisfaction, in the face of declines in quality of life due to such factors as crime, 
auto accidents, or pollution." Examples include hospital bills resulting from auto 
accidents, cost of repairing property due to air pollution, and installation of 
home security systems. The second is referred to as "social costs," and refers to 
divorce, loss of leisure time, and crime. Finally, the third category involves "the 
depreciation of environmental assets and natural resources." This is very broad 
category, ranging from loss of farmland and wetlands, to reduction in the supply 
of natural resources, and the deleterious affects of wastes and pollution. If these 
categories of factors are included in the calculation "[t]he result is a substantially 
different picture that that presented by the GDP"(Venetoulis and Cobb, 2004:3). 
This assertion is supported by data obtained in the San Francisco Bay Area. 
Venetoulis and Cobb report that in 2000, for example, the per capita GDP in the 
area was about 15 percent higher than the average GPI (2004:8). While 
admitting that the GPI "cannot accurately reflect everything of value in the 
economy-or life for that matter," nonetheless it "helps highlight an important 
message: the quality of economic development is at least as important as the 
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quality of economic activity as measured by GDP" (Venetoulis and Cobb, 
2004:1). 
But if the GPI can gauge the quality of development, it has no way of 
predicting that economic development will occur, any more than· the GDP can. 
Economists and other social scientists have labored hard to identify or construct 
a development paradigm. Despite substantial differences in approach, the 
proponents of modernization, dependency, world-system, and market reform 
models agree that countries fail to develop because some obstacle--such as lack 
of a key resource, weak state structures, or being outside the core of the 
capitalist world--prevents economic growth. In their article Nicole Woolsey 
Biggart and Mauro G. Guillen reject both the validity of the "critical factor" 
argument as well as the notion that there is "single path to development." 
According to them, there are different "viable paths" and development depends 
on historical, social, cultural, and organizational factors. "Economic growth," 
they assert, "depends on linking a country's historically developed patterns of 
social organization to the opportunities of global markets." But states are social 
organizations that do not exist in a vacuum, but "are a product of history and 
may have different legitimate roles in economic decision making across 
societies." State and societal organization and patterns of thinking and behaving 
are intimately connected to the very nature of the state and the society that 
support them. As such, "social and economic organization is informed by 
historically developed logics, which are changed only with difficulty" (Woolsey 
Biggart and Guillen, 1999:742). 
Using the auto industries of South Korea, Taiwan, Spain, and 
Argentina, Woosley Biggart and Guillen support empirically the importance of 
culture in economic development-a point made by a well-known French social 
scientist over four decades ago. In his classic, A History of Civilizations, 
Fernand Braude! wrote: 
In every period, a certain view of the world, a 
collective mentality, dominates the whole mass of society. Far 
more than the accidents or the historical circumstances of a 
period, it derives from the distant past, from ancient beliefs, 
fears, and anxieties which are almost unconscious-an 
immense contamination whose germs are lost to memory but 
transmitted from generation to generation. A society's 
reactions to the events of the day, to the pressure upon it, to 
the decisions it must face, are less a matter of logic or even 
self-interest than the response to an unexpressed and often 
inexpressible compulsion ansmg from the collective 
unconscious. (Braude!, 1993:22) 
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Further elaborating their argument, Woosley Biggart and Guillen make 
three significant points. First, national economies are "organized institutional 
arenas" whose organizational structure and logic "are historically developed, 
causally complex, and difficult to change in fundamental ways." Second, the 
very nature and substance of the "organizing logics limit countries' abilities to 
copy each other's development strategies." And three, cultural and social 
antecedents "influence a country's ability to produce efficiently and effectively." 
They note that "production systems" are not created in a social vacuum. Instead, 
"social patterns may promote or constrain the ability to innovate" (Woolsey 
Biggard and Guillen, 1999:742). 
NUMBERS CONFRONT REALITY 
Modem Mexico exemplifies the gap between per capita GDP and GPI 
as well as the affects of cultural and social factors in economic development. Let 
us look at the specifics. If measured by GPD alone, the country has experienced 
tremendous economic growth. Adjusted for inflation (2002 US dollars), 
Mexico's per capita GDP followed an impressive growth trajectory. Ten years 
after independence (1810) the per capita GDP stood at a mere $760. Eight 
decades later it had increased to $1157, and in 1950 it stood at $2085. By 1973, 
a few years before the nation faced an economic crisis, the per capita GDP had 
climbed to $4189, and by 2002 it had grown to $8811. Table 1 charts the 
percentage of growth in Mexico since the early 1960s. 
Despite the considerable economic slowdown, and even negative 
growth during the 1980s, measured by GDP, Mexico's overall economy 
performed remarkably well. Yet, these impressive statistics obfuscate the true 
picture. An examination of some key quality of life indicators paint a more 
gloomy reality than one would expect from a 2000 per capita PPP of $8.900. 
According to same source, official statistics, about 40 percent of Mexico's 
roughly 105 million people live below the poverty line. It should be noted that 
for this region of the world a person needs a minimum of $2 per day to meet 
nutrition and other essential needs (CIA World Factbook, 2003). Slightly less 
than half of the 40 percent of poor Mexicans live in absolute poverty. The 
United Nations' Human Development Report 1997, defines absolute poverty as 
"the income or expenditure level below which a minimum adequate diet plus 
essential non-food requirements are not affordable"(Human Development 
Report, 1997:238). What explains widespread poverty in the midst of moderate 
per capita GDP and purchasing power parity? 
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TABLE 1 
Mexico: GDP Growth Rate 
(in percentages) 
Year Rate 
1961 4.8 
1963 7.5 
1964 10.6 
1967 5.5 
1968 8.6 
1970 6.1 
1972 3.6 
1974 5.5 
1983 -4.2 
1984 3.6 
1985 2.6 
1986 -3.8 
1987 1.9 
1988 1.2 
1989 3.3 
1990 4.4 
1991 4.2 
1992 3.7 
1993 1.8 
1994 4.4 
1995 -6.1 
1996 5.4 
1997 6.8 
1998 5.1 
1999 3.6 
2000 6.7 
2001 -0.3 
2002 0.8 
Source: For the years 1961-1982, data are from World Resources Institute: GOP Yearly Growth. 
Washington, DC. 2003. For the years 1983-2002, the data was adopted from Charles H. Blake, 
Politics in Latin America. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2005, p. 350. 
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Mexico suffers from staggering income disparity and uneven 
distribution of wealth. The country's lower 10 percent of the population possess 
only 1.6 percent of the nation's wealth, while the top 10 percent owns 41.1 
percent (CIA World Factbook, 2003). The Gini Index, which measures income 
distribution, gave Mexico a high score of 53.1 in 1998. It should be noted that 
the lower the index, the more evenly income is distributed, the higher the less 
equitably (zero represents perfect equality, and 100 perfect inequality). For 
purposes of comparison, in the same year Japan scored 24.9, Britain 36.0, 
Jordan 36.4, China 40.3, US 40.8, and Russia 45.6. Mexico's neighbors display 
similar distribution rates: Ecuador 43.7, El Salvador 52.3, Peru 46.2, and 
Venezuela 48.8. The majority of Third World developing countries show similar 
patterns as Mexico's as far as income distribution and economic inequality are 
concerned (World Development Report, 2001:282-283). 
Corruption-that is, official misconduct or the abuse of power for 
private gain-is another factor that impedes a more equitable distribution of 
wealth in the Mexican landscape. Compiled and published by the Berlin-based 
Transparency International, the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) measures 
official misconduct, using a scale of 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt). A 
score below 5.0 is considered very negative. Mexico fares poorly. In 1998, with 
a score of 3.7 the country was ranked 50th out of 85 countries surveyed. The 
2001 survey included 91 countries and gave Mexico the same score, although it 
ranked dropped a notch, to 51. The next year's data featured 102 countries and 
Mexico showed a slight drop in score and rank, 3.6 and 58 respectively. Finally, 
the most recent results (2003), involving 133 countries, reflect an unchanged 
situation as far as the score, but a drop in rank from 58 to 56 (Transperancy 
International, 1998-2003). 
The rankings of the CPI index are supported by numerous scholarly 
publications. Gary W. Wynia, for example, states that "[n]o introduction to 
Mexican politics is complete without mention of the 'corruption' for which the 
nation has become notorious. Millions of dollars change hands every day 
between government officials and citizens." He goes on to say that "payments 
induce police to drop charges, tax collectors to ignore certain taxpayers, and 
government corporations to sign contracts with suppliers." Wynia reports that 
"few arrests" are made and "then only for the most outrageous abuses." He 
concludes on a pessimistic note: "For everyone else the need to pay for services 
will continue to be part of Mexican way of life, enticing new generations of 
politicians and civil servants to earn as much as their predecessors"(Wynia, 
1990:152-153). 
GPI quality of life costs compound the problem and further reduce 
Mexican citizens' incomes as reflected by GDP numbers. Nearly 75 percent of 
the country's population lives in large urban areas. A whopping 22 percent 
(approximately 20 million) make their home in the capital, Mexico City. The 
capital's population density is staggering: "5,500 persons per square kilometer." 
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Public transportation and privately owned vehicles create horrendous traffic 
jams. It is estimated that the average resident spends over three hours a day to go 
home to work and back (Mexico: A Country Study, 1997:91-92). In addition to 
lost time on the road, citizens have to cope with crime and fear for their personal 
security. "More than 100 serious crimes are reported each day in Mexico City." 
In 1997, for example, "one police officer was killed and one injured weekly." 
Corruption among Jaw enforcement officials and low pay are among the culprits. 
It is no accident that "a sense of insecurity prevails among many citizens 
because of the lack of confidence in the police and fear of police misbehavior" 
(Mexico: A Country Study, 1997:325-326). Mexico ranks 57 out of 59 countries 
in police reliability to protect private business, and 52 in legal corruption 
(Global Competitiveness Report, 200:249-252). Those who can afford hire 
private security, but others are forced to spend precious resources on extra locks, 
guns, and other security-rendering devices. 
Air and water pollution harm the quality of life and put additional 
pressure on already overstretched family budgets. Mexico's large industrial 
cities, such as Monterrey, Guadalajara, and Mexico City, as well as areas along 
the US border, are suffering the most. Despite some slight improvement in 
recent years, the Mexican megalopolis, for example, continues to have "the 
worst air pollution of any city on earth: the air quality is so bad that simple 
breathing was like smoking two packs of cigarettes a day"(Green and 
Luehrmann, 22003: 19). Lower wages and lax environmental regulations have 
prompted American firms to set up production facilities-known as 
maquiladoras--alongside the US border, attracting an increasing number of 
Mexican workers (Danopoulos, 2004:41-56). 
Population increase, coupled with poor waste management, antiquated 
equipment, and poor environmental regulation, have wreaked havoc in the air 
and water quality of these areas. The Rio Grande, a historically significant 
landmark to Mexican culture, has become "so contaminated by human fecal 
matter in the El Paso-Juarez area that even skin contact is dangerous because of 
the possible exposure to cholera and hepatitis and the micro organisms that 
cause dysentery carried in the waste"(Los Angeles Times, 1994). As result, 
health risks have intensified. For example, the average rate of hepatitis in the 
border region has stayed at 2-3 times the U.S. national average. All these are 
costs that are not included in GDP calculations, but have a negative affect on 
quality of life-related GPI categories of expenses. Even though there is no data 
to calculate the exact cost of these factors, the Mexican case exemplify 
Venetoulis and Cobb's contention that the GDP "is not a value free" 
measurement; neither is it a realistic method of measuring a country's market 
value of goods and services nor the true PPP of its citizens Venetoulis and Cobb, 
2004:2). 
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THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SETTING 
As stated earlier, GPI is as powerless as GDP to predict economic 
development or the success of a country's efforts to bring about economic 
growth though industrialization or other means. Success or failure is influenced 
by cultural, social, and historical logics. To understand the gap between GDP 
and PPI in the Mexican context an understanding of the country's milieu would 
be in order. 
Not even national independence can rival the seminal importance of the 
Mexican Revolution ( 191 0-1917) on the nature and the character of the Mexican 
state and its economic, social, political, and other institutions and ways of life. It 
began as a popular insurrection against the oligarchic Porfirio Diaz dictatorship, 
and was led by middle sectors, peasants, and working class people who "were 
denied large shares of the expanding pie." What followed was a chaotic 
uprising, which when it ended in 1917 had "destroyed the army, broke the grip 
of the regional bosses, drastically reduced what was left of the power of the 
Catholic Church, and weakened the strength of the landed elite" (Wynia, 
1990:144).A decade of violent revolution took the lives of an estimated 10 
percent of the population, including the top leaders: Zapata, Villa, and Madero. 
The 1917 constitution brought the bloody uprising to an end and proceeded to 
forge a political system that ostensibly espouses liberal democracy, with 
popularly elected legislature and president, and an independent judiciary. But 
behind the democratic fa~ade, the constitution established "a highly centralized 
and hierarchical political machine whose leaders exercised immense control 
over the nation" (Wynia, 1990:145). 
The country's post-revolution political system was strengthened in 
1928, when President Plutarcho Calles launched the National Revolutionary 
Party (PRI)--an organization that consisted of regional revolutionary generals 
and their followers. PRI became the nation's dominant political force and 
governed the country continuously for over seven decades. His successor, 
Lazaro Cardenas (1934-1940), introduced land reform and took additional steps 
rendering PRI in to a "corporatist-like party organization composed of three 
sectors: the Mexican Confederation of Labor; the national Peasant Association; 
and the so called 'popular' sector, which included teachers, public employees, 
small farmers, and the military"(Wynia, 1990:147). The highly centralized, 
Mexico City controlled, bureaucratic political and economic system is still 
largely in place and can be characterized as a prime example of a "corporatist 
state," i.e., a political system in which the government restricts the development 
and conduct of independent organizations. In other words, "[i]n corporatist 
systems society is divided by functions (such as unions, professional 
associations, etc), and government attempts to coordinate society by balancing 
groups that must negotiate with government for legal or economic benefits" 
(Green and Luehrmann, 2003:462). 
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The highly centralized, corporatist structure allowed Mexico's rulers to 
establish and maintain a stable economic system, and to usher the country into a 
path of industrialization and development. Under the import-substitution model 
of development the government sought to diversify the nation's economy and 
lessen its dependence on its neighbor to the north and other developed 
economies. It encouraged national industrialization by subsidizing and 
protecting local producers from foreign competition. As a result, a mixed 
economy emerged "with substantial state involvement and an expanding public 
sector, which included strategic industries, such as telecommunications, 
railroads, airlines, electric power, steel, mining, and, of course, petroleum and 
petrochemicals"(Hamilton, 2002:299). The importance of agriculture in the 
nation's GDP diminished considerably. In 2002, for instance, agriculture 
contributed only 5 percent to Mexico's GDP while the industrial sector's share 
was 26 percent and services 69 percent (CIA World Factbook, 2003). 
Mexico City's immense power to control and the corporatist political 
arrangement enabled the country to industrialize "with less rancor and class 
conflict" than any of its Latin America neighbors. The pervasive tentacles of 
PRI and its sheer enormity "kept organized labor and the rural poor under its 
close supervision" (Wynia, 1990:147). Wages were kept low and the state 
managed to co-opt organized labor "by strengthening labor leaders who were 
loyal to the government, creat[ing] a relatively low-cost and docile labor 
movement"(Kaufman Purcell, 1990:404). Yet Mexican presidents knew the 
potential power of organized labor and they used delicate balancing acts and 
doses of federal funds to dampen signs of labor unrest. Despite its seeming 
docility, then, organized labor was and remains one of the main pillars of the 
Mexican edifice, as organized and guided by the PRI. 
Besides the government and PRI dominated organized labor, the 
business community is the third and, arguably, the most powerful force. Even 
though Mexican presidents deliberately exclude domestic and foreign business 
from the limelight in order to maintain the populist image of the PRI and the 
government, they rely "on them (private entrepreneurs) to finance and manage 
much of the nation's mixed, capitalist economy" (Wynia, 1990:150). Banca 
Heredia describes the complex and often opaque and confrontational nature of 
government-business relations as "interdependence" 1995:193). The 
deterioration of Mexico's economy in recent years, coupled with the pressures 
of globalization and a weakening ofPRI power, have forced the country's ruling 
elites to adopt a more open and friendly attitude toward the business sector. In 
fact, as Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith point out, the last four PRI 
presidents (Jose Lopez Portillo, Miguel de la Madrid, Carlos Salinas, and 
Emesto Zedillo) came from the more pro business and technocratic wing of the 
party (Skidmore and Smith, 1992:247). This is even more true with the current 
president, Vicente Fox, who comes from the traditionally business-friendly 
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National Action Party (PAN). His election in 2000 broke PRJ's over seven 
decades long monopoly on power. 
The brief discussion of Mexico's socio-economic and political history 
provides ample evidence to suggest that social organization influences a nation's 
economic structure, ambiance, and climate. Woosley Biggart and Guillen's 
assertion that economies are "organized institutional arenas" with historically 
informed logic which is hard to alter substantially (Woosley Biggart and 
Guillen,l999:742). Wynia is on the mark when he states that "[a]process of 
political centralization that began under the Porfiriato (Diaz's rule, 1877-1911) 
was completed by the PRJ, giving the president and his bureaucrats in Mexico 
City immense control over the nation, making a mockery of constitutional 
claims of having created a federal republic"(Wynia, 1990:148). Excessive 
centralization stifled innovation and did little to promote competition and trade. 
It is culture, social, and historical antecedents, and not Ivory Tower crafted 
models of economic development, that determine success or failure. NAFT A 
appears to have done little to mitigate the situation. While the World Bank 
claims that the trade association had a positive impact on the Mexican economy, 
an analysis by Mark Weisbrot, David Rosnick, and Dean Baker suggests "that 
NAFTA led to slower growth in Mexico over the last decade" (2004). Similarly, 
Fox's efforts to reform the system and bring about grater tax equity, reduce 
corruption, and improve the labor law have "made no substantive progress 
during the first half of his term." And his lame duck status offers little hope that 
he will be more successful in the remainder of his tenure in office (Blake, 
2005:362-364). Herein lies an explanation in the significant gap between per 
capita GDP and GPI in Mexico. 
BY WAY OF CONCLUSION 
How does Mexico close the gap between numbers and reality? In other 
words what should the country do to uplift the millions of Mexicans who are 
poor and destitute? What should it do to improve water quality, sanitation, the 
environment, and the quality of life of its people? Treatment of a disease begins 
with a diagnosis. The first thing that needs clarification is who are those that 
find themselves at or below the poverty line (40 percent of the population). 
By and large, the ranks of the poor are filled with landless, unskilled 
people flooding the capital and other major industrial cities. The agrarian reform 
program that President Cardenas implemented in the 1930 expropriated land 
from rich landlords and redistributed it to landless peasants (campesinos). 
Though essential and helpful to many, the program was not sufficient to 
encompass the entire population. Some seven decades later, "[m]ost 
compesinos stay poor and a majority of them are still landless" (Wynia, 
1990:154). Industrialization and the promise of employment it generated lured 
millions of them in urban industrial centers. Once in urban center they joined the 
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ranks of urban (lumpen) proletariat. The overwhelming majority of the poor and 
the destitute come from the ranks of migrants and their descendants. A good 
number of them are squatters who scrape up a living in the informal economy of 
Mexico City and other urban centers. What is needed is a way to empower and 
enable them to become productive citizens. How? 
In a much quoted book, The Mystery of Capital, Hernando De Soto, a 
Peruvian social scientists, explains why capitalism works in the West, but fails 
every where else. Central to his theory is the contention that "the major 
stumbling block that keeps the rest of the world from benefiting from capitalism 
is its inability to produce capital." He attributes this to lack of solid and 
impregnable property rights, which robs people in developing countries of the 
opportunity to use property as "collateral for a loan [or] a share against 
investment." De Soto documents that "[m]ost of the poor already possess the 
assets they need to make a success of capitalism. Even in the poorest of 
countries, people save. The value of savings among the poor is, in fact, 
immense-forty times all foreign aid received throughout the world since 
1945." But what they do not have is the necessary legal guarantees and property 
rights to turn their savings into capital generating assets (De Soto, 2000:5-6). 
Ongoing social and economic problems have forced the Mexican 
government to step back and allow the entrepreneurial sector a much greater 
degree of freedom and influence in the country's economy. Beginning with the 
mid seventies, individuals with pro business attitudes ascended to the presidency 
and adopted pro business policies, while taking steps to reduce the role of 
interventionist role of the state in the nation's economy. Organized labor, 
though still holding considerable potential power, is searching to define its role 
now that its patron, the PRJ, lost its once unchallengeable position. 
Despite its diminishing position the Mexican state still holds immense 
political authority to introduce reforms that would empower the poor to become 
productive citizens. In another equally influential book, The Other Path, De 
Soto provides a promising strategy consisting of three interrelated and 
complimentary components: simplification, decentralization, and deregulation. 
Simplification aims to identify and eliminate parts of the law that are 
unnecessary, redundant, and duplicative. This would require "steps to optimize 
the function of legal institutions" so that they function independently and 
objectively. Harmful legislation impedes would be entrepreneurial activity and 
encourages informality by "raising the cost of entering and remaining in formal 
activity"(De Soto, 1989:247). Simplification is similar to "re-bureaucratization." 
In DeSoto's words, "simplification means reducing the cost of being productive 
without changing the political system" (DeSoto, 1989:248). 
By decentralization De Soto means to transfer "legislative and 
administrative" power to local and regional authorities. This does not mean 
shutting the central government down, but allowing local governments "a degree 
of decision making power" by giving them authority "to make laws on all those 
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matters which can be handled at the regional level." This would help because 
these governments are "in more direct contact with reality and the problems to 
be solved" (DeSoto, 1989:249). 
Finally, deregulation is seen as a means of increasing "the 
responsibilities of private individuals and reducing those of the state." This 
would accomplish four purposes: (1) would free the state from the responsibility 
of meddling involved with "production;" (2) would allow the state to 
concentrate in "administering justice" instead of "administering resources." 
This, in turn, would ensure respect for law and would minimize violations;" (3) 
freed from managing resources, the state would be able to concentrate "to doing 
those things which private individuals cannot do or do well-for instance, 
conservation of natural resources, and public property, the control of monopolies 
and restrictive practices, transport, and education, for none of which the private 
sector suffices;"tl and (4) deregulation would allow the state to redistribute 
resources to the poor in a way that would not "distort economic incentives, as 
does the transfer of money through taxation." De Soto believes that a 
deregulated state achieves those objectives by "facilitating and controlling the 
functions of the market, not by replacing it" (DeSoto, 1989252). 
There are no guarantees in this world and no assurances that DeSoto's 
formula would work. The book was published some years ago and a lot of things 
have happened since; in many ways the world is a different place. Yet allowing 
the present situation to continue in Mexico is unlikely to improve the situation. 
Something has to be done to close the gap between GDP and GPI. De Soto's 
strategy may be worth a shot. 
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